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I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S MOTION
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
A. The Association's claim that it "acted as the governing body pursuant to the
Declaration for 27 years" is not supported by the evidence.
The Association claims that it "has acted as the governing body pursuant to the
Declaration for twenty seven (27) years." Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. However, the
Association does not dispute the many differences between the Association and the
"George Osmond Estates Council" - the entity described in the Declaration. W., pp. 1823. Furthermore, in its Brief the Association has made no effort to explain how the
Association could have "acted as the governing body pursuant to the Declaration for
twenty seven (27) years" when the Association had a different name than the entity
described in the Declaration, was a different type of entity, had a different governing
body, had different memberships rights, had a different method of assessing fees, and had
a different method of enforcing assessments. Id. The differences between the
Association and the entity described in Declaration are summarized below.
Difference between the Entity Described in the Declaration and the Association
The Entity Described in Declaration

The Association

The entity authorized to act under the
Declaration is the "George Osmond
Estates Council" See Declaration, Section
1.1

The Association is the "Osmond Lane
Homeowners Association" R. 30.

The "George Osmond Estates Council"
was to be organized as a non-profit
corporation. See Declaration, Section

The Association claims to be an
unincorporated association. R. 30.

1

1.1(c).
The "George Osmond Estates Council"
was to be governed by a "Board of
Managers." See Declaration, Section

The Association is governed by president,
vice-president and secretary. See, e.g., R.
301.

The Declaration provided that
homeowners were to have "voting rights"
as "specified in the Articles of
Incorporation" for the George Osmond
Estates Council. See Declaration, Section
4.3.

The Association has no "Articles of
Incorporation" and has created no
document granting the homeowners any
"voting rights."

The George Osmond Estates Council was The Association makes annual
to make "annual assessments," one-half of assessments that are due in full on January
which would be due on January 1 and July 10 of each year. R. 697.
1 of each year. See Declaration, Section
6.6.
The George Osmond Estate Council was
to provide copies of its articles of
incorporation and the by-laws to all new
purchasers of property within the
Subdivision. See Declaration, Section
4.2.

The Association does not provide copies
of any articles of incorporation or any
other organizational documents to new
purchasers. R. 528-529, 697.

The George Osmond Estates Council was
to collect unpaid homeowners association
fees through a "continuing lien" procedure
described under Section 6.8 of the
Declaration. Declaration, Section 6.8.

The Association collects unpaid
homeowners association fees by filing
mechanic's liens. See Minutes of
Osmond Lane Homeowners Association
dated May 7, 1980, R. 148. ("[E]ach lot
owner pay $100.00 for maintaining the
center divider. This check is to be paid in
30 days or an extra $25.00 late charge for
the next 30 day period and then a
mechanic's lien will be placed on the
property.") (Emphasis added.) See also
May 12, 1980 minutes R. 149. ("If not
received [with the next 30 days], a
mechanics lien will be placed on the
property.) (Emphasis added.)
2

As evidence that the Association has "acted as the governing body pursuant to the
Declaration for 27 years" the Association states that it has "collected assessments" from
homeowners. Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. It is not necessary to have authority to act under a
recorded declaration to "collect assessments." In this case, the Association has "collected
assessments" by filing "mechanic's liens" against the property of homeowners that failed
to pay assessments - not pursuant to the procedure set forth in the Declaration.1 See
Appellant's Brief, pg. 7; R. 148-149.
As evidence that the Association has "acted as the governing body pursuant to the
Declaration for 27 years" the Association also claims that it has "enforced" the restrictive
covenants of the Declaration. Appellee's Brief, pg. 20. However, the Association has
failed to identify any homeowner (other than Landrith) against whom the Association has
attempted to enforce the restrictive covenants of the Declaration. IdL, pp. 20-23.
Finally, the Association argues that the Association is "a dba [registered] with the
State of Utah." Id, pg. 21. In its Complaint, the Association claimed that it was an
"unincorporated association." R. 30. In its Brief, the Association now claims it is a
"registered dba." Appellee's Brief, pg. 21. The Association was, in fact, "registered" on
April 22, 2002 with the Utah Department of Commerce as a dba of Nevin Anderson. See

'Under the Declaration, assessments were to be collected through a "continuing
lien" procedure described in Section 6.8 of the Declaration. "Mechanic's liens" are filed
to secure payment for improving, repairing or maintaining real property pursuant to the
Utah Mechanic's Lien Act. See Utah Code Ann. Section 38-1-1 et seq.
3

Addendum A hereto. Whether the Association is an "unincorporated association" (as the
Association claimed in the Complaint) or a "registered dba" of Nevan Anderson (as the
Association now claims in its Brief), it is undisputed that the Association is not a "nonprofit corporation," as described in the Declaration.
B. The Association's claim that other property owners have "recognized and
ratified" the Association as having authority to act under the Declaration is not supported
by the evidence.
The Association next claims in its Brief that other property owners have
"recognized and ratified" the Association as having authority to act under the Declaration.
Appellee's Brief, pp. 20-21. The fact that homeowners may have paid assessments to the
Association, or attended annual meetings, does not mean those homeowners ever
recognized the Association as the entity described in the Declaration. As discussed
above, the Association was not organized as the entity described in the Declaration, and
has not operated in the same manner as the entity described in the Declaration.
Even if this did constitute evidence that other homeowners had "recognized and
ratified" the Association as the entity described in the Declaration, that does not mean that
Landrith ever "recognized or ratified" the Association as the entity described in the
Declaration. As discussed below and in Appellant's Brief, Landrith did not. See
Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-14, 32-33.

4

C. The Association's claim that Landrith has "ratified" the Association as having
authority to Act under the Declaration is not supported by the evidence.
In its Brief, the Association claims that Landrith ratified the Association's
authority to act under Declaration since the Declaration was recorded against the Property
at the time Landrith purchased the Property. Appellee's Brief, pg. 22. However, the
Association was not the entity described in the Declaration. When the Association
attempted to assert authority against Landrith under Declaration - Landrith objected:
I do not now and have never consented to, acknowledged or
ratified the [the Association] as having authority to make
repairs to my property without my consent, or incur legal fees
in connection therewith, or lien and foreclose my property to
collect the same.
I do not now and have never consented to, acknowledged or
ratified the [the Association] as having authority to act as the
George Osmond Estates Council under the Declaration.
Supplemental Affidavit of George Landrith, f 7-8, R. 697.
The Association claims that Landrith "ratified" the Association as having authority
to act under the Declaration since he paid homeowner fees and special assessments to the
Association and attended one annual meeting. Appellee's Brief, pp. 21. Landrith
recognized the Association for what it was - an association of homeowners in the
Subdivision that was addressing common homeowners concerns, collecting annual dues
and paying common expenses of homeowners within the Subdivision - but nothing more.
The Association claims that Landrith "ratified" the Association as having authority
to act under the Declaration since he reimbursed the Association for some "repairs and
5

maintenance" made to the Property. As discussed in detail in Appellant's Brief, Landrith
reimbursed the Association for "repairs and maintenance" on two occasions - once under
written protest2 and once under an agreement recorded by Anderson in his journal that the
Association would make no future "repairs or maintenance" on the Property without
Landrith's prior consent.3 Appellant's Brief, pp. 12-13, 32-33.
In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all facts and inferences must be
reviewed in a light most favorable to the non-moving party. Surety Underwriters v. E&C
Trucking. Inc., 2000 UT 71, ^ 15, 10 P.3d 338 (Utah 2000). "[Sjummary judgment is
appropriate only when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Norman v. Arnold, 2002 UT 81, ^ 15,
57 P.3d 997 (Utah 2002).
In this case, viewing all "facts and inferences" in a light most favorable to Landrith
- the nonmoving party on the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment - at best, there
was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Association had ever "acted as" the
entity authorized to act under the Declaration or as to whether Landrith ever ratified the
Association as the entity described under the Declaration. Viewing the evidence in a light
2

Landrith reimbursed the Association $1,113.50 for "repairs and maintenance"
under a cover letter stating "my payment of this invoice is NOT any agreement on my part
as to the legitimacy of the enclosed invoice." Appellant's Brief, pg. 12.
3

Anderson recorded in his journal that Landrith and Anderson agreed that Landrith
would pay the Association's requested reimbursement for "repairs and maintenance," but
only on the condition that "repairs in the future will only be done with my approval and
prior notice and discussion with [Landrith]." Appellant's Brief, pg. 13.
6

most favorable to Landrith, there were material issues of fact in dispute and the trial court
errored in granting the Association's Motion for Summary Judgment
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN DENYING LANDRITH7S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Based on the undisputed facts, the Association was not the entity described in the
Declaration. At the time it was organized, the Association chose not to organize itself as
the entity described in the Declaration, and has operated in a manner entirely different
than the entity described under the Declaration. The Association has not disputed the
differences between the Association and the entity described in the Declaration. See
Appellee's Brief, pp. 18-23.
As a matter of law, it is not necessary to act under a recorded declaration to collect
"assessments" or to hold annual meetings. The Association has not disputed that it has
collected assessments by filing "mechanic's liens" - not pursuant to the collection
procedure set forth in the Declaration. Id The Association has not disputed that it has
never sought to enforce the restrictive covenants under the Declaration against any
homeowner other than Landrith. Id To claim authority to act under the Declaration, at a
minimum the Association must bear some resemblance to the entity described in
Declaration. In this case, the Association bears no resemblance to the entity described in
the Declaration. The trial court errored in denying Landrith's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

7

III. SECTION 8.4 OF THE DECLARATION IS INAPPLICABLE IN THIS CASE.
The Association next claims that in constructing the two retaining walls on the
Property and suing Landrith for the cost of construction, the Association was actually
acting pursuant to Section 8.4 of the Declaration - not as the entity described in the
Declaration. Section 8.4 of the Declaration provides that "if any person... violates the
provisions of this instrument, it shall be lawful for [another property owner] to institute
proceedings at law or in equity to enforce the provisions of this instrument." Declaration,
Section 8.4.
In its Motion for Summary Judgment and at trial, the Association proceeded
against Landrith under Sections 6.11 and 6.12 of the Declaration (claiming to be the
"George Osmond Estates Council"), not as an interested property owner as described
under Section 8.4 of the Declaration. £ee R. 472. Furthermore, Section 8.4 does not
authorize a property owner to make repairs to another property without that property
owner's consent, or to lien the property and foreclose on that lien to recover the cost of
those repairs. Section 8.4 only authorizes a property owner to enforce restrictive
covenants in the Declaration by initiating a proceeding "to enforce the provisions of [the
Declaration]," i.e., Section 8.4 only authorizes a property owner to file an action to have
the Court order another property owner to comply with restrictive covenants in the
Declaration.

8

In this case, the Association did not bring an action under Section 8.4 to have the
court order Landrith to fix the erosion. Instead, the Association fixed the erosion,
claiming authority to do so under Section 6.11 (claiming authority to act as the George
Osmond Estates Council), and then brought an action to foreclose the lien it had filed
against the Property to recover the cost of repair pursuant to Section 6.12. Those actions
could have only been undertaken by the George Osmond Estate Council (the entity
authorized to act under the Declaration.)
IV. THE COURT ERRORED IN EXCLUDING RILEY BRATT AS AN EXPERT
WITNESS.
In this case, Landrith claimed that the Association breached its duty to mitigate
damages by building two interlocking brick retaining walls at a cost of $32,878.93, when
the Association could have resolved the same problem by constructing a rock retaining
wall for a much lower cost.4 The Association did not dispute Landrith's analysis that the
Association's duty to mitigate damages included a duty to use less expensive alternative
means to fix the erosion problem. See Appellee's Brief, pg. 30. The Association claims,
however, that Riley Bratt did not have the requisite qualifications to testify as an expert
witness that a rock retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem
because Bratt was not an engineer and because Bratt examined the site after the two brick
retaining walls had been installed. Id.
4

The cost of constructing a rock retaining wall was a base cost of $7,252.00, that
would not have exceeded $11,452.00. See Appellant's Brief, pg. 38; R. 680-82.
9

At trial, Bratt testified that he had "been building rock walls for eight years." R.
1548, p. 286. Bratt testified that in preparation for giving his opinion he physically
inspected the site and also reviewed the engineering plans for the two retaining walls
constructed by the Association. R. 1548, p. 292. Mr. Bratt also attended the trial and
listened to the testimony of Kirk Johnson, the individual that constructed the two brick
retaining walls for the Association. Id. Mr. Bratt described other work he did in
preparation for giving his opinion as follows:
I got the information I needed, and I sat down and came up
with a square foot price for this wall - how many square feet
is going to go into a wall with - when you build a rock wall,
you've got to make sure that you have - you've got two feet in
the ground, and the - what happens is you've got a surcharge.
If you have a rock wall that's built, you've got to have it so it
has a pitch back as the other gentlemen was talking with his
block wall. Same thing with a rock wall. You've got a
surcharge that comes down against the wall, and you've got to
make sure that you have a pitch on that wall, and you've got
to make sure you have the geogrid in a row to make sure that
that - that the weight of the earth doesn't blow out the wall.
As I went through, I observed that this needed that. It needed
the geogrid. It needed fabric behind the wall to make sure
that the wall was- so that no moisture could come through
with erosion continuing after the wall was completed. So you
put fabric behind the rocks, and you put your geogrid in place,
you do your excavation.
R. 1548, pg. 288.

10

A. It was not necessary to be an engineer for Mr. Bratt to testify that a rock
retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion issue.
Mr. Bratt intended to testify that the Association could have satisfactorily resolved
the erosion problem through an alternative means (i.e., construction of a rock retaining
wall) at a much lower cost. Mr. Bratt did not need to be an engineer to testify that a rock
wall would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem or to testify as to the cost of
constructing the rock wall. Mr. Bratt testified that he had been building rock retaining
walls for eight years, had visited the site, had reviewed the engineering plans for the two
retaining walls built by the Association and had listened to the testimony of the individual
(Kirk Johnson) that had built the two brick retaining walls for the Association.
Rule 702 only requires that Bratt be qualified by "knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education." Bratt's "knowledge, skill, experience and training" and
preparation were sufficient to qualify Bratt to testify as to whether a rock retaining wall
would have satisfactorily resolved the erosion problem and the cost thereof. The
Association presented no witness that testified that only an engineer could testify as to
those issues.
B. Mr. Bratt did not need to visit the site before the two retaining walls were
constructed.
The Association argues that the fact that Mr. Bratt visited the site after the two
retaining walls had been constructed disqualified him as an expert witness. Appellee's

11

Brief, pg. 30. Since the two retaining walls were built before Landrith knew he would
need an expert witness, there was no way Bratt could have inspected the site before the
two walls were constructed. The Association presented no witness that testified that Bratt
needed to visit the site before the construction of the two retaining walls to accurately
form an opinion as to whether a rock retaining wall would have satisfactorily resolved the
erosion problem. In addition to visiting the site, Bratt reviewed the engineering plans
used to construct the walls and listened to the testimony of the person that constructed the
two brick retaining walls. The trial court errored in refusing to allow Bratt to testify at
trial.
V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN GRANTING THE ASSOCIATION'S
MOTION FOR DIRECTED VERDICT.
A. The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict
as to Landrith's defense of failure to mitigate damages.
(i) The Association breached its duty to mitigate damages by refusing to
allow Landrith to fix the hole. Landrith testified that he brought an independent
contractor to the Property on July 23, 2004 to fix the erosion problem by 'Tilling the hole
with dirt." R. 1548, pg. 346. Anderson was there and refused to allow the work to be
done, telling Landrith that this means of repairing the hole was "no longer acceptable."
R. 1548, pg. 346. The Association does not dispute this account, but claims that by July
23, 2004 "an engineer was needed to inspect and repair the hole." Appellee's Brief, pg.
30.
12

Mr. Anderson is not an engineer and as of that meeting - July 23, 2004 - no
engineer had been hired by the Association.5 In refusing to allow Mr. Landrith to fix the
erosion with an independent contractor on July 23, 2004, Mr. Anderson could not have
been relying on the advise of an engineer.
Furthermore, at trial, Steven Smith, the engineer hired by the Association, testified
that Mr. Landrith could have filled the "hole" with dirt - and restored the landscaping to
its original condition - without constructing two new retaining walls. Mr. Smith testified
that, absent an "erosion plan," over a period of time, "small riverlets" would be created
and eventually "you get back in the same situation:"
[A]t that point you'd have to have some type of an erosion
plan to keep the newly placed soil while - during weather
conditions, during rain runoff, during snow runoff, and if you
don't then small rivulets and created and eventually larger
gullies present themselves. Eventually you get to the same
situation.
R. 1548, pg. 187.
Mr. Smith did not testify that "refilling" the "hole" with dirt would not resolve the erosion
problem. He only testified that, over time, if there was no "erosion plan," the same
erosion problem may return.
Thus, according to Mr. Smith, Mr. Landrith's plan would have worked - but may
have failed at a later date if there was no erosion plan in place. If Mr. Landrith wanted to

5

Steven Smith was not hired until November, 2004. R. 1547, pg. 132; R. 1548, pp.
165-166.
13

take that risk that his solution may fail over time and additional remedial action may be
needed at a later date - that was Mr. Landrith's choice. The Association failed to
mitigate its damages by refusing to allow Mr. Landrith to fix the erosion through the
independent contractor that Landrith brought to the Property on July 23, 2004.
A reasonable Jury could have concluded that the Association failed to mitigate its
damages by refusing to allow Landrith's independent contractor to fill the "hole" in July,
2004. The Court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on the
mitigation of damages issue.
(ii) Failure to use less expensive alternative means. As previously
discussed, the trial court also errored in excluding Mr. Bratt's testimony, which would
have provided the basis for Landrith's defense that the Association also breached its duty
to mitigate by failing to use a less expensive alternative means to fix the erosion problem.
B. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
material breach by the Association.
(i) No approved plans. Steven Smith's engineering firm prepared plans for
the two retaining walls constructed by the Association on the Property. The Association
does not dispute that those plans were never submitted to the George Osmond Estates
Architectural Board, or to any other architectural board created by the Association.
Appellee's Brief, pg. 33.

14

The Association argues that it did not have to submit those plans to the Board
because the Association "acquiesced to the plans by allowing the work to go forward."
Id. Section 3.3 of the Declaration does not exempt the Association from submitting
plans, but provides that "no wall...shall be constructed...until plans...have been submitted
to the Board and approved in writing." The exception under Section 3.6 applies only if
"the Board fails to approve plans...submitted to it within thirty (30) days of submission."
"Board" is defined at the "George Osmond Estate Architectural and Planning Control
Board." Declaration, Section 1.1(A). In this case, the Association does not dispute that it
never submitted the plans for the walls to the Board, or to any architectural committee
created by the Association. Appellee's Brief, pp. 32-35.
The Declaration is a contract between the homeowners and the homeowners'
association, and its covenants protect both parties. Appellant's Brief, pp. 42-43. If the
Association had submitted those plans as required by Section 3.3, Landrith would have
received notice of the meeting at which those plans were to be reviewed and would have
had an opportunity to raise an objection to construction of the walls at that time. The
City cannot unilaterally "acquiesce" in its own violation of the Declaration. The Jury
could have reasonably concluded that the Association's failure to submit the plans (as
required under both Sections 3.3 and 3.6) constituted a material breach of the Declaration,
thereby excusing performance by Landrith.

15

(ii) No notice of entry of the Property. Under the Declaration, the George
Osmond Estates Council had to first give "reasonable notice" to Landrith before entering
the Property to perform any maintenance. Declaration, Section 6.13. Landrith testified
that the Association did not give him any notice that it was entering the Property prior to
construction of the two retaining walls. R. 1548, pg. 349. The Association disputes
Landrith's testimony, claiming that notice was given. Appellee's Brief, pp. 35-36.
Viewing the facts in a light most favorable to the non-moving party (Landrith), there was
a material issue of fact in dispute that should have been resolved by the Jury - not by the
Court.
(iii) No vote authorizing the $L450.00 special assessment. Section 6.2 of
the Declaration provides that assessments "shall be used for the...improvement and
maintenance of the Property," but that no assessments "shall be used for capital
improvements or expenditures" unless approved by a vote of "two-thirds of the
membership of the Council and mortgagees:"
The assessments levied by the Council shall be used for the
purpose of promoting the health, safety, and welfare of the
residents of George Osmond Estates and in particular for the
improvement and maintenance of the Property, the services,
and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area,
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and
insurance thereon and general maintenance, repair,
replacement, and additions thereto, the cost of labor,
equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof.
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital
improvements or expenditures unless approved by a vote of
two-thirds of the membership of the Council and mortgagees.
16

Declaration, Section 6.2. See Addendum B hereto.
As used therein, "Property" is defined to include all "real property which...is subject to
the Declaration."6 Declaration, First WHEREAS Clause, Section 2.1.
In its Brief, the Association only discussed Section 6.4, making no mention of
Section 6.2. Appellee's Brief, pp. 37-39. Section 6.2 does not limit the 2/3rd vote
requirement to "Common Areas" - but requires a 2/3rd vote before any assessments can
be used for "capital improvements or expenditures" "with respect to the "Property,"
which is defined as "real property which... is subject to the Declaration." Landrith's
Property is "real property which...is subject to the Declaration," and therefore is
"Property" within the meaning of Section 6.2, and therefore Section 6.2 requires a 2/3rd
vote before any "capital improvements or expenditures" can be made to Landrith's
Property.
Landrith proposed the following Jury Instruction to assist the Jury in determining
whether construction of the two retaining walls constituted a "capital improvements or
expenditures" within the meaning of Section 6.2:
[A] "capital improvement" is the addition of a permanent
structural improvement or the restoration of some aspect of a
property that will either enhance the property's overall value
or increases it useful life.

6

Section 6.2 states that "assessments levied by the Council" shall be used "in
particular for the improvement and maintenance of the Property, the services, and
facilities and the Common Areas." "Property" is defined as "[t]he real property...which is
subject to the Declaration."
17

R. 1368. A copy thereof is attached hereto as Addendum C.
Steven Smith, the engineer hired by the Association, testified that the two new retaining
walls were intended to be "stable" and withstand pressures that may "push the retaining
wall." Id. at 169. Conrad Guymon, an engineer that also did work for the Association on
the design for the two new retaining walls, testified that the retaining walls were intended
to be "stable" and withstand "hydrostatic pressure." Id at 201-203. Mr. Guymon also
testified that rebuilding the railroad tie wall "would not be a permanent solution" implying that the two retaining walls were a "permanent solution." Id at 211. A Jury
could have reasonably concluded that the two retaining walls met the definition of a
"capital improvements or expenditures," i.e. - they were "permanent structural
improvement(s)" that "enhanced the property's overall value" - and therefore a 2/3rds
vote was required under Section 6.2 of the Declaration.
The Declaration is a contract between the homeowners' association and the
homeowners, with covenants for the protection of both parties. Appellant's Brief, pp. 4243. Had the Association complied with Section 6.2, and held a vote, Landrith would have
had an opportunity to argue against the construction of the two retaining walls at the time
of that vote. Because the vote was never held, Landrith never had that opportunity, and a
$1,450.00 "special assessment" was imposed on each homeowner to build two retaining
walls on the Property that was never approved by the required 2/3rds vote.
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The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for directed verdict on
the issue of whether the two retaining walls were "capital improvements," and therefore a
2/3rd vote was required under Section 6.2 of the Declaration.
(iv) No authorizing resolution. In this case, the Association produced no
resolution at trial authorizing the construction of the two walls, or the assessment of the
$1,450.00 special assessment to pay for the two retaining walls. Under the Association's
theory of the case, it was acting as the "George Osmond Estates Council," a non-profit
corporation. A corporation can act only by a resolution authorizing an action. In this
case, the Association has produced no resolution authorizing any of the actions taken by
the Association with respect to Landrith or the Property. Absent such a resolution, the
Association had no authority to construct the two retaining walls, impose the $1,450.00
special assessment or otherwise take any action with respect to Landrith or the Property..
C. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
waiver by the Association.
In Appellee's Brief, the Association summarized Landrith's evidence of waiver as
follows:
Appellant raises the argument that the [the Association] has
waived its authority to act under the Declaration, because in
1977 the George Osmond Estates Council was organized by
that the [the Association] did not operate pursuant to the
Declaration. Specifically, Appellant notes that the [the
Association] did not incorporate as a non-profit corporation,
did not adopt any organizing document granting voting rights,
did not give copies of its Articles of Incorporation to new
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purchasers, and did not assess one-half (14) of the annual
assessments on the due dates provided in the Declaration.
Appellant thus argues that a fact finder could have found that
the [the Association] waived its authority to act pursuant to
the Declaration and that a directed verdict was not
appropriate.
Appellee's Brief, pg. 42.
The Association then stated that Landrith "has provided no evidence" of waiver. Id.
Clearly, there is evidence of waiver - the Association just summarized the evidence of
waiver. A reasonable Jury could conclude that the Association waived the right to act
under the Declaration since the Association did not organize itself as the entity described
in the Declaration and did not operate (and has not operated) in the manner described in
the Declaration. The trial court errored in granting the Association's motion for direct
verdict on Landrith's defense of waiver.
D. The trial court errored in granting a directed verdict as to Landrith's defense of
breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by the Association.
To find that the Association breached its implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing with Landrith under the Declaration, a finder of fact need only find that the
Association breached Landrith's "justified expectations" under the Declaration that were
consistent with the "common purposes" of the Declaration. Appellant's Brief, pg. 45.
In this case, Landrith testified that Anderson told Landrith that it would cost at
least $100,000.00 to fix the erosion, but that if Landrith would sell the Property to him for
$200,000.00 then Landrith would not have to worry about fixing the erosion. Appellant's
20

Brief, pg. 45-46. Landrith subsequently sold the Property for $445,000. R. 528.
Anderson did not dispute the foregoing testimony at trial.
A finder of fact could have concluded that Anderson was attempting to use his
position as president of the Association to advance his own pecuniary interest by using
the threat of the "hole" to pressure Landrith into selling the Property to him at a discount.
There was evidence on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the Association
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court errored in granting the
City's motion for directed verdict on Landrith's defense that the City had breached its
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
VI. INTEREST WAS NOT CALCULATED CORRECTLY IN THE JUDGMENT.
In its Calculation of Interest, filed on December 12, 2008, the Association
calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to the
Section 6.8 of Declaration. R. 1474. In its Revised Calculation of Interest the Association
also calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). R. 1510. The Judgment
signed by the Court and drafted by the Association also calculated interest pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2). R. 1521. In its Brief, the Association provided no
explanation as to why the Association calculated interest pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated Section 15-1-1(2), rather than pursuant to Section 6.8 of the Declaration.
If the Association were acting pursuant to the Declaration, it would have
calculated interest pursuant to the Declaration. Section 6.12 of the Declaration provides
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that "[t]he cost of exterior maintenance" shall be "added to and become part of the annual
assessments." Section 6.6 provides that the "annual assessments" shall be "payable in
semi-annual installments" - V2 on January 1 and lA on July 1. Section 6.8 provides that
"[i]f the assessment is not paid within thirty (30) days of the delinquency date" it shall
bear interest "from the date of delinquency" at the rate of 10% per annum.
In this case, the invoice dates for the $32,878.92 claimed by the Association in its
Notice of Lien were as follows:
Date of invoice

Amount

5-17-05
9-25-05
11-01-05
12-01-05
12-01-05
12-31-05

$2,757.63
$13,500.00
$248.87
$13,434.43
$2,690.00
$190.49

R. 1510.
According to Section 6.8 of the Declaration, one-half ($16,439.36) would have
been due on January 1, 2006 and one-half ($16,439.36) would have been due on July 1,
2006. Pursuant to Section 6.8, $16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum
from January 31, 2006 through January 12, 2009 (the date the Judgment was entered), and
$16,439.36 would have accrued interest at 10% per annum from July 31, 2006 through
January 12, 2009 - for a total of approximately $8,877.25 in interest.7

Interest on the two subsequent invoices from Rainmaker of Utah (the May 15,
2006 invoice of $74.20 and the July 15, 2008 invoice of $161.00), calculated pursuant to
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Instead, the Association calculated interest from the date of invoice (not from the
date of delinquency) and calculated interest under Section 15-1-1(2) for a total of
$10,627.75, or about $1,750.50 more that if calculation pursuant to Section 6.8.
In its Brief, the Association states that under the Declaration, assessments incurred
in 2005 should become part of the 2005 assessment:
Appellant's calculation wrongfully applies the exterior
maintenance costs incurred in 2005 to the 2006 annual
assessment costs. A careful reading of the Declaration,
however, indicates that the exterior maintenance costs
incurred during 2005 are due as part of the 2005 annual
assessment.
Appellee's Brief, pg. 46.
The Association's analysis is wrong. The "invoice date" for $13,500 was September 25,
2005, and the "invoice date" for $13,434.43 was December 1, 2005. How could those
amounts have been assessed as part of the 2005 assessment, with !4 due on January 1,
2005 and lA due on July 1, 2005, when those invoices weren't even billed until
September and December, 2005.
VII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN AWARDING $403.82 IN COSTS.
In this case, the Association did not oppose Landrith's objection to $329.89 in
costs - stating that the Association "would accept a reduction of costs...in the amount of
$329.89." The other $74.93 was for copy costs for George Landrith's deposition (not the

Section 6.8 the Declaration would constitute an additional $25.49 of interest, for a total of
$8,902.74.
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cost of George Landrith's deposition - which was claimed separately in the amount of
$929.00). Copy costs are not recoverable as "costs." See Beaver v. Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT
81, 31 P.3d 1147 (Utah 2001.)
The Association provides no explanation as to why it submitted a Judgment to the
Court that included costs that the Association it was "willing to reduce" - and should not
have been awarded. The Court provided no explanation as to why it overruled an
objection that the Association did not oppose (and agreed with).
VIII. THE TRIAL COURT ERRORED IN ITS AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The trial court awarded all fees claimed - with no analysis whatsoever. Landrith
objected to the overall reasonableness of the attorney's fees. R. 1533. One of the
examples cited by Landrith was billing Landrith for "training time" for a new attorney Aaron Lancaster. In its Brief, the Association includes evidence that was not provided to
the trial court. Appellee's Brief, pg. 51 (.Aaron Lancaster had been licensed to practice
law in Nevada since October of 2006 and in Utah since May of 2007.) While that may be
true, it was not presented to the trial court.
As cited in Appellant's Brief, In re Estate of Quinn, 830 P.2d 282, 285 (Utah Ct.
App. 1992) requires findings of fact on attorneys' fees - and "[t]hose findings must be
sufficiently detailed and include enough subsidiary facts, to disclose the steps by which
the trial court's decision was reached." Id at 286. The Association claims that In re
Estate of Quinn doesn't apply since Landrith didn't provide any "evidence" to dispute the
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reasonableness of the attorney's fees claimed by the Association. The "evidence" was set
forth in the Objection to Form of Judgment (with Revised Calculation of Interest). R.
1528-34. In that Objection, Landrith filed an overall objection to the reasonableness of
attorney's fees, citing both duplication of services and "training time" as two examples of
why the attorney's fees were unreasonable. LI at 15-29-1530.
The Association cited Cabrera v. CottrelL 694 P.2d 622 (Utah 1985) for the
proposition that the sentence in the Judgment awarding attorney's fees is a sufficient
"finding of fact." The Cottrell Court only held that those findings of fact may be included
in the "findings of fact and conclusions of law" set forth as part of a Judgment, and need
not be separate. In this case, the trial court entered no "findings of fact or conclusions of
law" relating to its award of attorney's fees, either as part of the Judgment or separately.
IX. IF SUCCESSFUL. LANDRITH SHOULD BE AWARDED ATTORNEY'S FEES.
In opposition to Landrith's request for attorney's fees on appeal if successful, the
Association only cites Robertson's Marine, Inc. v. 14 Solutions, Inc., 223 P.3d 1141
(Ut.App. 2010), a case which is consistent with Landrith's position. In that case, the
Court awarded attorney's fees on appeal for successfully defending an appeal on a
contract claim, where the contract included an attorney's fees clause. In this case, the
Declaration also includes an "attorney's fees clause." If successful on appeal, Landrith
should also be awarded his attorney's fees.
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Dated this

'-> day of April, 2010.

^Russell Cline, Attorney for Defendant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ij_ day of April, 2010,1 caused to be delivered
two copies first class mail, postage pre-paid, the foregoing to:
Thomas W. Seiler
Robinson, Seiler & Anderson, L.C.
80 North 100 East
P.O. Box 1266
Provo,UT 84603-1266
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Addendum A - Registration of
Osmond Lane Homeowners
Association
dba of Nevin
Anderson
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Provo
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OSMOND LANE H0!\
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04/22/2002
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777 OSMOND LANE
Provo, UT 84604

Status
Active
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04/22/2002
03/05/2008
DBA
04/22/2011
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This Status Date:
Last Renewed:
License Type:
Delinquent Date:

Registered Agent
NEVINN ANDERSEN
[Search.BESJ [Search. RPS]
777 OSMOND LANE

Registered Agent:
Address Line 1:
Address Line 2:
City:
State:
Zip:

Provo
UT
84604
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entity, click the button on the left. You will be assessed a $ 1.00 fee for this
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Addendum B - Section 6.2 of
the Declaration of Protective
Covenants

Section 4.2 Compliance with Council Articles, ByiLaws, etc.
Each Owner shall abide by and benefit from each provision, covenant,
condition and restriction contained \r\ the Articles of Incorporation and
By-Laws of the Council, a copy of which 1s provided to each" Owner at the
time of purchase, and by which each Owner agrees to be bound* or which
Is contained in any rule, regulation, or restriction promulgated pursuant
to said Articles and By-Laws. The obligations, burdens, and benefits of
membership in the Council, to the extent that they touch and concern the
land, shall be covenants running with each Owner's Parcel for the
benefit of all other Parcels and the Common Area.
Section 4.3 Voting Rights. The voting rights of the members
shall be as specified 1n the Articles of Incorporation.
ARTICLE Y
RIGHTS IN THE COMMON AREA
Section 5.1 Members' Licenses of Enjoyment. Every member of
the Council shall have an irrevocable license to enjoy the Common Area.
Access to the private road may be controlled by a lockable gate, provided
that said gate must meet all requirements of the City of Provo and other
governmental agencies.
Section 5.2 Title to Common Area. The Declarant, its successors
and assigns shall retain the legal title to the Common Area until such
time as it has completed improvements thereon and until such time as, in
the opinion of the Declarant, the Council is able to maintain the same,
but notwithstanding any provisions herein, the Declarant hereby covenants,
for itself, its heirs and assigns, that 1t shall convey the Common Area
to the Council not later than October 1, 1978.
Section 5.3 Right to Transfer. The right of the Council to
dedicate or transfer all or any part of the Common Area to any public
agency, authority, or utility for such purposes and subject to such
conditions as may be agreed to by the members, provided that no such
dedication or transfer, determination as to the purposes or as to the
conditions thereof, shall be effective unless an instrument signed by
members entitled to cast two-thirds (2/3) of the votes has been recorded,
agreeing to such dedication, transfer, purpose or condition, and unless
written notice of the proposed agreement and action thereunder is sent
to every member at least thirty (30) days in advance of any action
taken.
ARTICLE VI
COVENANT FOR MAINTENANCE ASSESSMENTS
Section 6.1 Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation of
Assessments. Each Owner of any Parcel by acceptance of a deed therefor,
whether or not 1t shall be so expressed 1n any such deed or other conveyance,
agrees to pay to the Council: (1) annual assessments or charges as
provided herein; and (2) special assessments for capital improvements,
such assessments to be fixed, established, and collected from time to
time as hereinafter provided. The annual and special assessments,
together with such interest thereon and costs of collection thereof as
hereinafter provided, shall be a charge on the land and shall be a
continuing lien upon the property against which each such assessment 1s
made until paid. Each ^uch assessment, together with such interest
thereon and cost of collection thereof as hereinafter provided, shall
also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
Parcel at the time when the assessment fell due.
Section 6.2 Purpose of Assessments. The assessments levied
by the Council shall be used for the purpose of promoting the health,
safety, and welfare of the residents of George Osmond Estates and in
particular for the Improvement and maintenance of the Property, the
services, and facilities devoted to this purpose and the Common Area,
including but not limited to, the payment of taxes and insurance thereon
and general maintenance, repair, replacement, and additions thereto, the
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cost of labor, equipment, materials, management, and supervision thereof.
No assessments or fees hereunder shall be used for capital Improvements
or expenditures unless approved by a vote of two-thirds of the membership
of the Council and mortgagees.
Section 6.3 Assessments. Annual assessments shall begin in
the year beginning January 1, 1978. Unless changed by vote of the
membership, the maximum annual assessment for any Parcel shall be $200.00
per year. The Board of Managers of the Council may, after consideration
of the current maintenance costs and the financial requirements of the
Council, fix the actual assessment at an amount less than the maximum.
The maximum annual assessment may be charged as follows:
A.
From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be Increased each year not more than 10% above
the maximum assesn?ent for the previous year without a vote of
the membership.
B. From and after January 1, 1978, the maximum annual
assessment may be increased above 10% by a vote of one-half
(1/2) of the members who are voting 1n person or by proxy, at
a meeting duly called for this purpose.
C. The Board of Managers may fix the annual assessment
at an amount n-jt 1n excess of the maximum.
Written notice of any meeting of members called to change the
maximum annual assessment shall be sent to all members at least thirty
(30) days in advance of the date of such meeting, setting forth the
purposes of the meeting.
Section 6.4 Special Assessments for Capital Improvements.
In addition to the annual assessments authorized by Section 6.3 hereof,
the Board of Managers of the Council may levy a special assessment for
the purpose of defraying, In whole or in part, the cost of any construction
or reconstruction, unexpected repair or replacement of any capital
improvements upon the Common Area, including the necessary fixtures and
personal property related thereto, provided that any such assessment
shall have the assent of two-thirds (2/3) of the votes of the Council
who are voting in person or by proxy at a meeting duly called for this
purpose, written notice of which shall be sent to all members at least
thirty (30) days in advance and shall set forth the purpose of the
meeting.
Section 6.5 Quorum. A quorum for any action authorized under
Sections 6.3 and 6.4 hereof shall be as follows:
At the first meeting called, as provided in Sections 6.3 and
6.4 hereof, the presence at the meeting of members, or of
proxies entitled to cast sixty percent (60%) of all votes of
the Council shall constitute a quorum. If the required quorum
1s not forthcoming at any meeting, another meeting may be
called, subject to the notice requirements set forth in Sections
6.3 and 6.4 and the required quorum at any such subsequent
meeting shall be one-half of the required quorum at the
preceding meeting, provided that no such subsequent meeting
shall be held more than sixty (60) days following the preceding
meeting.
Section 6.6 Payment of Annual Assessments: Due Dates. The
annual assessments provided for herein shall be payable in semi-annual
installments (1/2 of the annual assessment) on the first day of each
January and July of each year. The due date of any special assessments
under Section 6.4 hereof shall be fixed in the resolution authorizing
such assessment.
Section 6.7 Duties of the Council. The Council shall, at
least ten (10) days in advance of the assessment date or period, prepare
a roster of the properties and assessments applicable thereto which
shall be kept in the office of the Council and shall be open to inspection
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Addendum £ - Proposed Jury
Instruction defining "Capital
Improvements"

INSTRUCTION NO.
An "capital improvement" is the addition of a permanent
structural improvement or the restoration of some aspect of a
property that will either enhance the property's overall value or
increases its useful life.
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